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Abstract The paper provides a conceptual model that examines (i) open-
access exploitation and(ii) mangrove deforestation as two potential causes for
the scarcity of post-larval shrimp inputs to shrimp mariculture in Ecuador.
Results indicate that conversion of mangrove ecosystems to shrimp ponds may
have obtained short-term profit at the expense of long-term productivity.
Open-access collection of post-larval shrimp may also have contributed to
dwindling stock levels. Specific policy recommendations are presented, and
future empirical studies are proposed.
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Introduction
Ecuador's shrimp industry grew rapidly during the past fifteen years, to become
by 1988 the country's second largest earner of foreign currency. At that time,
Ecuador was the largest supplier of shrimp to the United States and one of the
largest mariculture producers in the world (Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias
1989). However, recent decline in the competitiveness of the industry has raised
concerns about its future stability, and has focused national attention on how to
develop policies to sustain the productivity and competitiveness of shrimp mari-
culture in Ecuador.
Important factors contributing to the decline of shrimp mariculture include (0
the reduced availability of post-larval shrimp (PLS) to stock shrimp ponds, (i7) low
productivity of mature shrimp per hectare of ponds, {Hi) fluctuations of interna-
tional market prices for mature shrimp and (/v) growing competition from Asian
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producers. While general policy guidelines have been developed to address some
of these factors (e.g., Olsen and Arriaga 1989, Southgate and Whitaker 1994),
there are relatively few analytical studies that can provide more specific policy
recommendations.
This paper provides a conceptual model that examines two potential causes for
scarcity of PLS inputs. The model is introduced to clarify the relationships among
PLS collection, shrimp production, and mangrove habitat, and to make specific
policy recommendations based on these relationships. Causes for PLS scarcity
that can be examined include open-access exploitation of the PLS fishery (Insti-
tuto de Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989, Thian-Eng and Kungvankij 1989) and the
depletion of mangrove habitat for PLS (Jothy 1984, Pauly and Ingles 1986, Turner
1989). Alternative explanations for stock fluctuations, such as the El Nino phe-
nomenon—a southward shift of warm ocean current into Ecuadorian waters—of
1982-83, are considered in the context of comparative statics. The model identi-
fies efficient market policies to correct for open access and deforestation exter-
nalities.
Results indicate that if mangrove ecosystems infiuence PLS stock develop-
ment, conversion of forests to ponds for shrimp production has obtained short-
term profit at the expense of long-term productivity. Specific policy recommen-
dations are presented, and future empirical studies are proposed. If Ecuador's
shrimp industry is to maintain its competitiveness in the world market, it must
invest in mangrove habitat restoration and technological improvements to in-
crease long-run productivity per hectare, rather than continue to mine the coun-
try's renewable mangrove resources for nonsustainable benefit.
The next sections discuss shrimp mariculture in Ecuador and present a con-
ceptual model. The model examines potential links between the current crisis the
industry faces, the depletion of mangrove habitats, and the open-access collection
of PLS. This is followed by a discussion of results, conclusions, and policy rec-
ommendations.
Shrimp Mariculture in Ecuador
This section first describes the shrimp production cycle, collection of PLS inputs
to shrimp production by artesano fishermen, and the potential links between PLS
stocks and mangrove ecosystems. The section concludes by discussing the de-
velopment of shrimp mariculture in Ecuador from its beginnings in 1979.
Shrimp Production
A shrimp producer enters the production cycle first by obtaining a concession to
publicly-owned coastal lands below the high-tide line. If mangroves are present,
the producer determines how much of these lands must be cleared for ponds.
Trees are typically removed by workers using chainsaws, and the residual bio-
mass is burned. Once the forest has been removed, a bulldozer is used to create
a rectangular levee that encloses a fiat, rectangular pond. Most ponds are between
two and three meters deep and between seven and fifteen hectares. After the pond
has been built, it is filled by water pumped from adjacent estuaries and stocked
with PLS.
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ing shrimp ponds. Stocking densities range from 30,000 to 50,000 PLS per hectare,
depending on management intensity. Once the PLS are mature, they are collected
by workers in canoes, who sweep nets through the pond until the mature shrimp
are removed. The mature shrimp are sold by the shrimp producer to processors
who ready them for final consumption. The pond is then pumped dry, and fresh
water is input for the next production cycle.
Collection of Post-Larval Shrimp by Artesanos
Pennaeus vannamei PLS are obtained by shrimp producers from middlemen, who
in turn purchase them from artesano fishermen. Artensanos collect PLS in an
open-access fishery. In Ecuador, PLS are collected by a few thousand full-time
and about 10,000 part-time artesano fishermen who make a living collecting PLS
with hand-held nets in estuaries and beaches along the coast (Scott and Gaibor
1992). Artesanos collect PLS using nets, which are held in knee-deep water
(roughly one meter deep). Once the net is full, the artesano fisherman returns to
the beach, and typically discards species other than Pennaeus vannamei. A day's
catch of Pennaeus vannamei PLS is stored in buckets, which are sold to middle-
men. The middlemen, in turn, transport the buckets of PLS to shrimp producers'
ponds in unrefrigerated trucks (LiPuma and Meltzoff 1985).
The Shrimp Life Cycle and Mangrove Ecosystems
Shrimp begin life in the open sea. After going through several maturation phases,
including a larval phase, the post-larval shrimp move to estuarine waters. Post-
larval shrimp remain in estuaries between three and five months before returning
to the ocean. The estuarine habitat provides nutrient-rich substrates such as man-
grove roots; the mangroves' complex vegetative system may also provide pro-
tection from predators (Turner 1989).
Many studies link PLS stocks to mangrove ecosystems. Jothy (1984) and Pauly
and Ingles (1986) provide data for Malaysia and the Philippines that suggest that
although estuarine salinity and water temperature changes affect the survival rate
of PLS, in the long-term, yields are related to both quality and quantity of the
mangrove habitat. Similar studies from the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana and Japan
corroborate this hypothesis (Turner 1989).
Mangrove forests are among the most biologically productive marine ecosys-
tems. These forests are essential habitat for many species in addition to PLS. In
addition to providing habitat, these ecosystems maintain water quality; they func-
tion as "kidneys" for estuarine environments by purifying water and ensuring
sufficient oxygen for marine species (Webb-Vidal 1992). Other non-market and
market benefits provided by mangrove forests include sediment stabilization, bird
habitat and a renewable supply of forest products such as edible fruits, bark for
tanning, charcoal and construction wood (Hamilton et al. 1989). These benefits
are only examples of the types of benefits that can be provided by mangrove
ecosystems. Dixon and Lai (1994) give a thorough overview of the functions,
products, and attributes provided by eight globally-important wetlands categories,
including mangroves.4 Parks and Bonifaz
National Trends in Shrimp Mariculture
Shrimp mariculture has dramatically changed Ecuador's coastal land uses. By
1991, 146,000 hectares had been converted to shrimp ponds (Table 1). The first
shrimp ponds were placed on intertidal salt flats, where costs of pumping and PLS
stocking are lower; however, since 1979 pond construction has expanded into
estuarine ecosystems. This includes the conversion of 41,700 hectares of man-
groves, one-fifth of Ecuador's coastal mangrove resources (Table 1). Individual
estuaries have lost as much as half the primary mangrove forest (Centro de Le-
vantamientos Integrados de Recursos Naturales 1992). In addition, some low-
lying agricultural lands have also been converted to ponds; high residual salinity
in the converted lands makes this change practically irreversible.
The shrimp industry expanded most rapidly between 1979 and 1984. In 1978
there were 5,416 hectares of legally authorized shrimp ponds in production. By
1984, authorized pond area grew to 89,400 hectares (Table 1). Meanwhile, annual
shrimp production increased more than 600 percent, from less than 5,000 tonnes
(one tonne equals lO^g) of shrimp in 1979 to over 33,000 tonnes by 1984 (Table 2).
Currently the industry's pond area has expanded to 146,000 hectares and produc-
tion has grown to about 100,000 metric tonnes year"' (Centro de Levantamientos
Integrados por Sensores Remotos 1992).
International competition in shrimp production is growing. The entry of more
efficient and productive producers into the market has caused international prices
to fall (Table 2). Ecuador's ability to compete with other countries is in jeopardy.
Over half of Ecuador's shrimp industry is dominated by semi-extensive produc-
tion technologies. These technologies depend primarily on large pond areas and
PLS collected in the wild. Average productivity in Ecuador is 0.68 metric tonnes
hectare"' (Table 3). This productivity is less than that found in Honduras and
Mexico—Ecuador's closes Latin American competitors—and far less than China
and Thailand—Asian competitors that have made effective use of hatchery-
produced PLS inputs (Rosenberry 1992).
The rapid growth ofthe industry during the early 1980s can be attributed to the
abundance of PLS stock during El Nino, low costs for establishing ponds on
intertidal salt flats, and high demand and prices for shrimp in United States mar-
kets. In 1983, almost all authorized ponds were placed into production (93 per-
cent. Table 4). However, beginning in the mid-1980s, PLS required to stock ponds
became scarce (Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989, Iverson et al. 1989).
Shortages have been severe enough that since 1985 only half of authorized pond
Table 1
























(Source: Centro de Levantamientos Integrados de Recursos
Naturales por Sensores Remotos 1992).Mangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador
Table 2
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area is used in production (Table 4). In addition to changes in water temperature,
loss of habitat and overfishing of PLS stocks decreased the PLS available for pond
production of shrimp.
Decreases in stock of a marine species are difficult to document. This is
especially true with PLS, which are collected for subsistence income by artesano
fishermen in an open-access fishery: few, if any, catch-effort studies exist. How-
ever, there is some preliminary economic evidence that scarcity has increased:
prices paid for PLS inputs have increased (Sutinen et al. 1989, Southgate and
Whitaker 1994). If marginal extraction costs for a given stock of PLS are relatively
constant—an assumption that seems reasonable given harvesting practices (see
Table 3
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(Source: Acuacultura det Ecuador, 1988, Centro de Le-
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the discussion of artesanos above)—then the increasing gap between price and
marginal cost may indicate a scarcer stock.
The next section integrates the benefits provided by PLS collection, shrimp
production, and mangrove ecosystems into an economic management problem.
The problem faced by Ecuador is to determine how to sustain maximum joint
benefits from the PLS fishery, shrimp production, and mangrove ecosystems.
The Social Planner's Problem
A social planner' for the shrimp mariculture sector will optimize benefits in both
the PLS and shrimp sectors by choosing the amounts of shrimp to produce and
PLS to harvest, as well as the area of ponds to create from mangroves. Potential
benefits from undisturbed mangrove ecosystems include not only PLS habitat but
also other benefits that may be unrelated to PLS or shrimp (e.g., water quality
improvement). Consider the case where the sector is comprised of n shrimp
farmers operating as price-takers in a competitive market. Each farmer deter-
mines the amount of shrimp to produce, y^,. Shrimp production is a function of
' A social planner is introduced as a rhetorical device to identify how decisions would be
made if all economic benefits and costs were considered by a single decisionmaker. Al-
though no single agency in Ecuador has the authority to control all of the decision vari-
ables, this rhetorical strategy identifies policies that—when introduced into individual de-
cisions of artesanos and shrimp producers—provide incentives for individual decisions to
accomplish collective goals.Mangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador 7
the amount of PLS used to stock the ponds, ypLs.n and the area of ponds em-
ployed, P,. (The time subscripts for shrimp production and PLS harvests will be
suppressed from this point on.) Each farmer's ability to produce shrimp from
these inputs is described by the function y, = fs(ypLS'Pi)- The cost to produce y^
units of shrimp is c^CyJ^. Each unit of shrimp produced can be sold at p^; demand
faced by the industry as a whole is downward-sloping, and is given by the function
Ps(nys).
The planner must also choose y/./,^, the PLS harvests for m price-taking ar-
tesano fishermen. Artesanos sell their harvests at price PPLS>' total demand for
PLS is downward-sloping, and is given by Pp^s^'^ypLs)- Each artesano incurs a
cost Cpj^s(ypLS'^PLs.i) for catching ypi^s units of PLS; costs depend not only on
harvest, but also on the stock of PLS, Xpj^s.r (The time subscript on stock will be
suppressed from this point on.) We maintain the assumption that when PLS are
abundant, they are easier (i.e., cheaper) to catch; thus, the marginal cost of PLS
harvest decreases with stock, dCpi^s^dXp^^s < 0- The development of PLS stock
over time depends on the relationship between harvest and growth. Total PLS
harvest is myp^s! growth is determined by current stock ATp^^, as well as by the
amount of mangroves present, M,. The recruitment function for PLS stock is
pLsLS
The planner determines pond area by choosing d,, the area of mangrove forests
to deforest and place into ponds. The cost of converting mangroves to ponds is
cj^d,). When left as mangroves, a mangrove area of M, will provide benefits (e.g.,
water quality improvement) o{B(M,). The problem below treats all mangroves as
potentially eligible for conversion; maintaining some mangroves in preserves
yields essentially the same policy conclusions.
In order to maximize joint benefits from shrimp production, PLS harvest, and
mangrove ecosystems, the social planner must maximize the discounted sum of
consumer surplus, producer surplus and mangrove benefits. The planner obtains
benefits by choosing shrimp harvest, y,, deforestation rate, d,, and PLS harvest,
ypLs- Surpluses are obtained in both the shrimp and PLS sectors. The present
value of net benefits is:
PVNB =
B(M,)\ e'^'dt, (1)
where r is the planner's rate of time preference for benefits. Constraints include
shrimp production technology, fs(ypLs>Pi)' which depends on PLS input, yp^^S'
and pond area, P,, for each of the n firms:
ys = fs(ypLs>P,)- (2)
^ Given the variations in PLS availability, the costs of PLS inputs to shrimp production
could be considered stochastic. Introducing stochastic costs, PLS harvests, and PLS
stocks would clarify the role of risk in the system, but would not substantially change the
conclusions of the analysis. A deterministic formulation is used to arrive at conclusions
more directly.8 Parks and Bonifaz
Change in pond area, P,, for each of the n firms changes with the deforestation
rate d, that the planner selects for the firm:
P, = d,. (3)
Change in total mangrove area depends on the total deforestation the planner
chooses for all n firms:
M, = -nd,. (4)
The change in Xpj^^' the stock of PLS, depends on the existing stock and on the
area of mangroves. The rate of change in PLS stock is the difference between
recruitment and harvest:
^PLS = AXpcsMi) - mypLs- (5)
Finally, available labor and capital may place constraints on rates of deforesta-
tion:
0 « ^, « dMAX., (6)
The social planner can obtain maximum benefits by solving the Hamiltonian, H:
+ I I"""-'PPLsiOdi - mcpLs(ypLS,XpLs)\ + B{M,)
(7)
Where w represents the marginal value of an additional unit of shrimp. The vari-
ables \p „ \M „ and \x.t are the marginal values assigned by the planner to ad-
ditional hectares in ponds and mangroves, and to an additional unit of PLS har-
vest, respectively. The social planner's optimal choice for shrimp production is
given by:
dH
^ = Ps(.nys)n - nc's - ww = 0. (8)
In order to maximize PVNB from shrimp production, the social planner will
require w, the shadow value of an additional unit of shrimp production, to equal
marginal revenue less marginal cost, p^ - c',. The planner's best choices for PLS
harvests are given by:Mangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador 9
dCpLs dfs
- m —— + ma —— + \x.t{-m) = 0. (9)
To maximize PVNB from PLS harvests, the planner must balance the net benefits
obtained by harvesting PLS with the opportunity costs of decreasing the PLS
stock. Net benefits consist of (0 marginal surpluses in the PLS sector, m[ppi^s ~
dCpLs/dypLsi, and (//) marginal surpluses in the shrimp sector (provided by an
additional unit of PLS harvest), n(x)[dfjdypi^s\. Marginal opportunity costs of re-
ducing PLS stock are given by mX;^,. In addition to these static results, the
costate equations for X^ „ kj^^ „ and k^,, can give the social planner insight into
how the values of ponds, mangroves, and PLS stocks should be managed over
time.
The costate equation for ponds is given by:
kp, = rkp,,-(^^^/n. (10)
Which, after solving for the planner's valuation of land in ponds, becomes
dfs , dfs
The marginal value of an additional hectare of ponds, kp „ is the sum of dis-
counted marginal benefits in shrimp production (the first term on the right-hand
side above) and discounted capital gains. This definition for the value of land in
ponds provides context for the planner's problem of deciding how much (if any)
to deforest.
The planner's decisions for optimum deforestation (indicated by df) are guided
by the following conditions:
BH
df = dt if-^ = 0, and
dH
df = dMAX., if^ > 0. (12)
The intuition behind the planner's optimum deforestation choices lies in the po-
tential effects of deforestation:
dH
— = -nc'Mt) + nkpj - nkM,,- (13)
adt
When the marginal benefits of converting land to ponds, kp,, minus marginal
costs of deforestation, c^, exceeds the marginal value of land in mangroves, X^,,
the planner will maximize PVNB by clearing mangroves as rapidly as possible. In10 Parks and Bonifaz
contrast, if marginal benefits from preserving mangroves exceeds marginal (net)
value in ponds, then the planner will maximize PVNB by ceasing deforestation.
(As the mangrove ecosystems become scarcer and scarcer, it is possible that
marginal benefits contributed by these ecosystems, B'(M,), increase. Arguments
for a moratorium on mangrove conversion would depend in part on this assump-
tion.) The Planner's marginal value for a hectare of mangroves deserves more
attention.
As with the ponds, the costate equation for mangroves reveals to the planner
the components of this value:
. dH
,, - \B'(M,) + \x., ^1. (14)
With some rearranging, the planner's marginal value for a hectare in mangroves
can be seen to consist of the sum of (0 discounted value of additional PLS stocks,
(ii) discounted marginal ecosystem benefits, and (n'O discounted capital gains.
These terms are shown in order on the right-hand side below:
The final shadow price required is X^.K the value of an additional unit of PLS
stock; this is the planner's marginal vaiue per unit of additional PLS stocks (i.e.,
the "price" of additional stock in the first term on the right-hand side above). The
planner's valuation of additional PLS stock can be obtained from the costate




If we consider r - dfldX, to be the planner's rate of time preference, adjusted for
the growth of stock (e.g., the adjusted opportunity cost of a growing capital
stock), we obtain a result analogous to the results for pond and mangrove shadow
values:
The first term includes the stock effect of a cost savings for each of the m arte-
sanos. Since the costs of catching PLS decrease when PLS are abundant, we can
conclude that dCp^s/dX, < 0; thus, the stock effect adds a positive amount to theMangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador 11
planner's valuation of additional PLS. The second term is the planner's expected
capital gain in the value of the stock, discounted using the adjusted rate.
In summary, the planner can obtain maximum benefits by equating marginal
benefits with marginal costs for shrimp production, PLS harvests, and defores-
tation. Benefits from conserving the mangrove endowment include increased PLS
stocks (cf. Swallow 1990) and other benefits unrelated to PLS and shrimp. To
facilitate the design of market policies, the next section develops a model of
individual shrimp producer and artesano decisions. Policies are identified by com-
paring the individual solutions with the planner's benefit maximizing choices.
Instruments are proposed that provide incentives for individual behavior to opti-
mize social economic welfare.
The Shrimp Farmer's Problem
With the social planner's problem complete, we can now examine the problem
from the perspective of the private shrimp producer. The goal of each of the n
shrimp producers is select shrimp production, 3^^, and deforestation, d,, in such a
way as to maximize producer surplus, which is
(18)
The parameter r is the producer's rate of time preference (e.g., the opportunity
cost of capital devoted to shrimp production). It should be noted that the discount
rate used by the producer and social planner need not be equal. When private and
social rates are different, discounted values assigned to future mangrove or pond
benefits will differ. In this case, empirical simulations can be used to identify the
values required for policy instruments (see below).
The development of pond area over time is given by the deforestation rate (as
in the planner's problem), and shrimp production technology remains the same.
However, the mangrove endowment for a single firm is Mjn, so that the devel-
opment of mangrove area over time appears differently than in the planner's
problem:
MJn = -d,. (19)
The producer can determine optimum PLS inputs, ypLs, and pond inputs (i.e.,
deforestation), d,, from the Hamiltonian:
A (20)
From the producer's perspective, PLS harvests are exogenously determined by
artesanos, and thus do not appear in the producer's benefit function. The pro-
ducer can determine optimum PLS from:12 Parks and Bonifaz
Because the marginal value of an additional unit of shrimp, co, is p^ - c^, the
producer will maximize profits by selecting PLS inputs until the value of the
marginal product of PLS, PsWJdyp^sl is equal to its marginal cost, c'sidfjdyp^gl
This is the producer's derived demand for PLS inputs.
In order to maximize profit from deforestation, the producer uses the same
principle as the planner: convert mangroves to shrimp ponds when benefits in
ponds exceed the marginal value of land in mangroves. The costate equation for
pond growth shows that kp,, the value to the producer of an additional hectare of
ponds, is the sum of discounted net benefits and capital gains. So far, the pro-
ducer's rule is the same as the planner's. However, profit maximizing deforesta-
tion choices for the producer diverge considerably, because the value of man-
groves to the producer is very different than the value to the planner. For exam-
ple, consider the costate equation for mangroves derived from the producer's
problem:
= r\M,,. (22)
Taken together, the costate equation and the producer's optimum deforestation
condition (i.e., -nc'J,dt) -\- nkp, - nX^.t = 0) show that the mangroves' value
to the producer derives only from the potential for pond conversion. When con-
version is not profitable, the mangrove endowment is worthless; in contrast, when
profits are to be made, the producer maximizes profits by deforesting as rapidly
as available labor and capital will permit.
Economic Policy Instruments
In order to reconcile the producers' profit-maximizing deforestation rate with the
social planner's benefit-maximizing rate, discounted benefits provided by man-
groves must be internalized by the producer. A tax that includes (0 discounted
stock effects of additional mangrove habitat, and (ii) discounted non-PLS man-
grove benefits, would internalize the environmental opportunity costs currently
omitted in the producer's problem. Making these costs internal to the producer's
decisions would lead the individual producers, acting to maximize their own ben-
efits, to accomplish the collective welfare-maximizing solution sought by the plan-
ner. A tax on mangrove-clearing would ultimately provide more PLS habitat,
which could in turn help replenish the dwindling stock. However, this is only part
of an integrated solution.
Individual choices by producers and artesanos also determine the level of PLS
harvest. Producers determine demand for PLS inputs, which in turn are supplied
by artesanos. The aggregate harvest by artesanos influences the development of
PLS stock over time. We have already seen how the producer will demand PLS
in order to maximize profits. In an open-access PLS fishery with minimal costs ofMangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador 13
entry (i.e., the cost of a hand-held net), artesanos determine the supply of PLS by
harvesting until all rents are dissipated. The supply of PLS is given by
PPLS --— = 0. (23)
y
The producer's derived demand for PLS inputs and the artesanos' supply of PLS
can be rewritten for comparison to the social planner's solution:
Ps T^ - c; e^ + m\ppLs - ^^^ = 0. (24)
oypLs dypLs] [ ypLsj
From this, we can see that the shrimp producers and artesanos will interact to
exploit the PLS stock at greater harvests than the social planner. A tax of dcpi^^l
^ypLs ~ ^PLslypLs will correct for the open-access externality, and an additional
kxj will account for opportunity costs of decreases in stock. Making these costs
internal to the artesanos' decisions would accomplish the collective welfare-
maximizing solution sought by the planner. Although these taxes would enable the
PLS stock to recover, such instruments may be costly to administer and enforce
(see below). While licensing fees that approximate these costs are a possibility,
other regulatory instruments to reduce catch, such as quotas or equipment re-
strictions, may be more feasible.
The next section will argue that weak regulations and institutions may have led
the industry to assign a value of zero to all costs of mangrove conversion other
than the direct costs of clearing. The long-term consequences of this are de-
creased PLS stocks for individual farmers, and national productivity declines for
the industry as a whole.
Discussion
If mangrove habitat effects PLS stock, then the increasing scarcity of PLS rep-
resents a growing opportunity cost for the industry and fishermen in the form of
foregone future benefits. By selecting excessive deforestation rates, the industry
may have purchased short term profits at the expense of long-term sustainable
productivity.
One of the most critical consequences of the crises of the mid-1980s was the
generation of a vicious cycle between mature shrimp prices and PLS fishing rates.
This occurs in the market for PLS as a factor input. The supply of PLS is deter-
mined by open-access collection by artesanos. The demand for PLS inputs is the
derived demand of shrimp producers for a production input. The rapid expansion
of the industry's pond hectarage (Table 1) precipitated increased demand for PLS
inputs. This created excess rents in the PLS market, and encouraged artesanos to
increase PLS harvest rates, ultimately leading to the overexploitation of the re-
source. Diminished PLS stocks leads producers to compete for smaller and
smaller amounts of PLS inputs, while at the same time, artesanos must continue
to increase their effort to support their families from a dwindling PLS stock.
Exogenous shocks to the PLS input market, such as El Nino, provide transi-
tory windfalls to both producers and artesanos. The warmer temperatures may be14 Parks and Bonifaz
favorable to recruitment, which increases stock and lowers extraction costs to
artesano suppliers. (The abundant PLS are easier to catch.) This downward shift
in PLS supply decreases the marginal factor cost to shrimp producers, leading to
increased equilibrium demand for PLS inputs. Equilibrium extraction (after El
Nino causes a downward shift in PLS supply) may be greater than under normal
ocean temperatures; however, this can only be temporarily supported. If capacity
expands to take advantage of these ephemeral conditions, overcapacity (Table 4)
is a natural consequence when the ocean (and PLS stocks) return to normal
conditions.
The economic interaction between shrimp farmers demanding PLS inputs and
artesano fishermen collecting these inputs can be environmentally devastating.
Their unregulated interaction may perpetuate the crisis that the shrimp industry
suffers. There are no public agencies regulating the activities of the artesano
fishermen and, in fact, there is a government decree clearly stating that all
beaches, estuaries and mangrove ecosystems of public access are open to PLS
fishing (Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989).
Much of the alteration of coastal ecosystems in Ecuador can be attributed to
the legal standing of coastal resources. Although a legal and institutional frame-
work has been in place to regulate the development of the industry, for all prac-
tical purposes access to the resources has been completely free (LiPuma and
Meltzoff 1985, Perez and Robadue 1989). According to Ecuadorian laws all
coastal land lying below the highest tide line belongs to the government (LiPuma
and Meltzoff 1985, Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989). That is, coastal
beaches, large portions of salt flats and of course, all mangrove forests and estu-
arine ecosystems. The most critical example of the weakness of laws and gov-
ernment institutions is the total failure to protect the mangrove forests.
A 1975 regulation and its 1985 amendment contain specific articles prohibiting
the conversion of mangrove forests to shrimp ponds. In addition, a law concerned
with forestry and conservation of flora and fauna enacted in 1978 prohibits the
construction of ponds in mangrove areas. Moreover, there are other laws and
decrees enacted by several government agencies which created protected areas
and declared the conservation of mangrove forests as "in the public interest"
(Instituto de Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989). In spite of these laws, the rate of
mangrove deforestation between 1979 and 1991 averaged about 3000 hectares per
year, resulting in the loss of one-fifth of Ecuador's mangrove forests (Table 1).
The laws and regulations governing the industry were not designed to encour-
age a sustainable relationship between economic objectives and ecosystem man-
agement. In 1975 the government issued a regulation allowing the construction
and operation of shrimp ponds on public lands under a renewable 10-year con-
cession. Although the system of concessions was well intentioned, it very quickly
became an open source of corruption and a critical policy issue affecting resource
management. A longer concession that allowed producers to reap the PLS stock
benefits from mangrove conservation would make more economic sense. The
short length of current concessions may contribute to incentives for the short-
term mining of mangrove resources as a location for ponds. In addition, the
government sells concessions for far below their value: the annual charge, equal
to 11 percent of a minimum monthly wage per hectare, is generally less than $10.
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placing these lands in ponds; this rent can exceed $2000 per hectare per year
(Southgate and Whitaker 1994).
Short-term concession arrangements and poorly-enforced laws are among the
main causes for the excessive deforestation and degradation of Ecuador's coastal
ecosystems. Although government agencies must take much of the blame for the
problems that the industry faces, it is also possible that shrimp farmers' failure to
recognize the costs of environmental disturbance are critical components for un-
derstanding the industry's dilemma. One of the most dramatic consequences of
the lack of planning and regulation of the industry is the excessive amount of land
in ponds relative to the availability of PLS (Table 4). The result of this imbalance
is that the industry's installed capacity has been largely under-used (Instituto de
Estrategias Agropecuarias 1989), and the ratio of shrimp produced to area in
ponds has fallen below those of competing countries (Table 3).
Due to the lack of integrated planning, short term rent-seeking behavior of the
industry, and unenforced laws, Ecuador's mariculture industry has developed
without considering environmental costs. This has cost the industry competitive-
ness, and resulted in excessive deforestation and the uncontrolled collection of
PLS. The industry's failure to recognize these opportunity costs is jeopardizing
the long-term sustainability of the industry itself.
Policy Recommendations
The conceptual model explores the consequences of a relationship between man-
grove habitat and PLS stocks and concludes that deforestation may have been
excessive. The most important policy implication of these results is that command
and control approaches have completely failed to regulate the industry's eco-
nomic development. In addition, public policies have encouraged the overexploi-
tation of PLS stocks through open-access collection by artesanos. If drastic pol-
icy measures are not implemented, ecosystem destruction will continue as long as
there are profits to be made from mangrove forest conversion and PLS collection.
Had it been implemented and enforced before the expansion in the early 1980s,
an incentive-based tax approach could have encouraged recognition of the full
costs of deforestation. While it is true that the industry has been subjected to a tax
on shrimp exports (Sutinen et al. 1989 p31), this has failed to slow conversion of
mangroves (Table 1). A tax that is more directly linked to pond construction
would help internalize the opportunity costs of deforestation. The addition of
these costs into the shrimp producers decisions could prevent excessive conver-
sion of mangroves to ponds.
In the long term, there may be opportunities for tax revenues to be recycled
into profitable investments in mangrove reforestation. Incentives to supplement
these public investments with private funds could be strengthened by increasing
the length of the land concessions. Concession length should be sufficient to allow
concession holders to benefit from reforestation activities that they undertake
{e.g., sufficiently long for PLS stocks to respond to increased habitat area).
If the effects of mangrove deforestation on PLS stocks are fairly localized
{e.g., within an estuary) it may be feasible to internalize the opportunity costs of
deforestation to cooperatives of shrimp producers within an estuary. Cordell and
McKean (1992) identify physical and technical attributes and decisionmaking ar-16 Parks and Bonifaz
rangements that have led to sustainable management of fisheries commons in
Bahia, Brazil. These commons have flourished with minimal reliance government
agencies or policies. Provided that similar conditions are present in Ecuador,
private solutions to excess exploitation of mangrove stocks by shrimp produc-
ers—or of PLS stocks by artesanos—may be possible.
At the same time, if Ecuador is to maintain its competitiveness in the world
shrimp market it is also critical that the industry's productivity per hectare be
increased. To accomplish this, investments in human capital and scientific re-
search must be encouraged. The development of a sustainable and profitable
hatchery industry is a viable short- and long-term alternative to the unreliable
supply of PLS collected in the wild. By providing a larger, more stable supply of
PLS inputs, hatcheries will increase the industry's productivity per hectare. Im-
proving the ability of hatchery-produced PLS to survive the production cycle is
essential.
, This approach represents a shift from land-intensive shrimp technology to
capital-intensive technology; a shift that has already succeeded in Asia (Table 3).
The change in inputs from land toward capital will also help prevent future con-
version of mangrove forests and agricultural land. An expanded model of the
shrimp mariculture sector that includes both wild and hatchery-produced PLS
inputs could clarify the incentives necessary for these shifts. Producing more
shrimp from a relatively stable land base is clearly a step toward restoring and
sustaining Ecuador's competitive position in the global shrimp market.
Although PLS hatcheries may contribute to a sustainable shrimp industry for
Ecuador, their economic viability is uncertain. For example, equilibrium demand
for PLS produced in hatcheries may fluctuate with changes in ocean temperature.
When the El Nino effect is present, wild PLS is abundant and cheap; profit-
maximizing shrimp producers may displace PLS produced in hatcheries with
cheaper wild PLS. Therefore, quantifying and planning for temperature effects on
the hatchery industry is essential before any program designed to support this
industry can be developed.
Conceptual extensions of the model can help by examining the economic
connection between ocean temperature fluctuations and the returns to hatchery
investment. As a starting point, one can recognize that since temperature is ex-
ogenous, the supply of wild PLS and derived demand for PLS inputs will depend
on temperature levels. If wild PLS and PLS produced in hatcheries are substitut-
able inputs, then comparative statics could subsequently be used to anticipate
how shrimp producers would change demand in response to changes in the avail-
ability of both types of PLS.
Finally, it is important to point out that many of the policies encouraging the
mismanagement of coastal ecosystems are similar to the policies stimulating trop-
ical deforestation. For example, the lack of enforceability of laws that prevent the
use of forests in an open access fashion and the failure to recognize the opportu-
nity costs of tropical forest conversion are parallel issues to the case of coastal
resource management. Therefore, this study's arguments and results could cau-
tiously be extended to analyze some of the socio-economic forces and policies
behind rainforest conversion. Extension of these policy recommendations pre-
sumes a positive economic feedback for those who make conservation decisions
{i.e., increased PLS stocks and lower input costs for shrimp producers). In the
case of tropical forests, conservation benefits directly accrue to decisionmakers inMangrove Deforestation and Mariculture in Ecuador 17
some contexts (e.g., ecotourism revenues, marketed rain forest products), but not
everywhere that deforestation is of concern.
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